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ABSTRACT
Psychological theories of inter-group behaviour offer justified representations for interaction, influence, and moti-
vation for coalescence. Agent-based modelling of this behaviour, using evolutionary approaches, further provides
a powerful tool to examine the implications of these theories in a dynamic context. In particular, this can
enhance our understanding of the escalation of hostility and warfare, and its mitigation, contributing to policy
and interventions. In this paper we propose a framework through which social psychology can be embedded in
computation for the examination of inter-group behaviour. We examine how various social-psychological theo-
ries can be embedded in evolutionary models, and identify ways in which visualisation can support the objective
assessment of emergent behaviour. We also discuss how real-world data can be used to parameterise scenarios
on which modelling is conducted.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Humans have evolved with the ability to coordinate through groups, which provide a survival advantage.1,2 In
environments characterised by scarce resources, success from working together against threats has promoted
selection in favour of those groups with strong in-group loyalty and cooperation, and strong out-group combat-
iveness against rivals.3,4 Aspects of this behaviour are well seen in today’s society, reflecting conflict situations
on the one hand through to extraordinary acts of altruism and in-group support on the other. Cultural evolution,
through the ability to socially interact and copy others plays an important role in this coordination.5,6
Understanding the dynamics that underpin behaviour and interactions remains an important area of study
that spans a range of disciplines, with potentially diverse methodological approaches. In this paper we are
particularly interested in exploring the extent to which computation can be used to increase understanding
of how group level interactions occur, and lead to the fracture and formation of groups. This is particular
relevant to the importance of groups in threats to world peace. While previously the cold war and its associated
arms race was characterised by clearly identifiable actors, formal administrations, territorial boundaries and
observable behaviour,7 many modern conflicts are less clear cut and much more challenging to explicitly model
and understand.8 Groups play a particularly important role in this context, but rationally modelling and
understanding group behaviour and conflict is a challenge, particularly in extreme situations.
One approach to making progress is through computational modelling. Generally speaking, the advantage
of this methodological approach is that scenarios can be developed and assumptions tested that allow a deeper
understanding of complex dynamics to be ascertained. Users may rerun and interpret many different and
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hypothetical situations that allow insights to be built. It is also possible to address large-scale scenarios and
emulate thousands of interactions that are difficult to observe by any other means. However the complexity of
human behaviour necessitates some form of abstraction takes place, because it is impossible to model or even
represent every facet of human behaviour in a computational or quantitative form.
In this paper we argue that progress can be made however, by basing computational models on established
theory, or testable assumptions, that represent different aspects of human psychological behaviour. This approach
has a number of important aspects. Firstly it means that due diligence has been paid, through development of
the theory itself, to actions and consequences of human behaviour. Secondly it allows static theory, which has
been developed on the observation individuals or small samples, to be examined in a dynamic setting, such as
when many individuals interact based on specific assumptions about each response behaviour. Thirdly it allows
dynamics from assumptions about individual behaviour to be better understood, in terms of the characteristics
that groups represent.
However behaviour that can be represented through computation requires theory that can be readily detected
and discretised into actions. Qualitative theory in particular is therefore challenging to translate, but theories
based on interaction or representation through functions lend themselves more in this direction. We present
examples of such theories and approaches from psychology, also giving insights concerning their implementation
in a wider event-driven framework. This is focussed on in-group and out-group effects, which represent a
fundamental starting point for modelling inter-group behaviour.
2. SNAPSHOT OF KEY THEORY CONCERNING INTER-GROUP BEHAVIOUR
The origins of relevant theory date back to the turn of twentieth century. Early psychological contributions
on structural conflict theory9 and realistic conflict theory10,11 were aligned with environments characterised by
promoted selection in favour of those groups with strong in-group loyalty and cooperation, and strong out-group
combativeness against rivals. However these early contributions fell short of explaining why biased group-based
attitudes may persist even in the absence of conflict or resource scarcity. Allport12 proposed that susceptibility
to group-based stereotyping13 was a contributory factor, being an efficient heuristic that avoids deliberation
but leaves social judgements susceptible to erroneous influences and over-generalisation in respect of group
members.14
Allport’s Intergroup Contact Hypothesis12 proposed that positive effects of intergroup contact occur only
when there is equal group status, common goals, intergroup cooperation and the support of authorities, law
or custom. Intergroup contact theory15,16 has subsequently extended these conditions and sought to explain
processes by which contact changes attitudes and behaviour, specifically through learning about the out-group,
changing behaviour, generating effective ties and reappraising the in-group. This theory predicts that patterns
of contact between groups can counteract over-generalisation and mitigate prejudice when members of respective
groups can identify with each other.
More generally, social identity has emerged as the predominant paradigm for understanding intergroup phe-
nomena.17–19 Self-identification of the in-group based on a common identity,20 whether based on fixed traits
(e.g., ethnicity or religion) or mutable beliefs (e.g., opinions or preferences), has been shown to predict in-group
favoritism as well as out-group hostility.18,21,22 Much of the research in this area has sought to understand the
division between the in-group and out-group. Given the correspondence between the definitions of an in-group
and out-group (i.e., one implies the other), in-group bias is often conflated with out-group prejudice,23 resulting
in an implicit and erroneous assumption that these concepts are interchangeable. Therefore the considerable
research on the behaviour and conditions that support in-group favoritism19,24–26 is insufficient to determine the
conditions that promote prejudicial attitudes. Current knowledge of the processes that support the in-group rein-
forcement are framed through advanced cognition, such as affective capabilities, social intelligence and intuition
over deliberation.13,14,27
More recently, there has also been theorising on the role of an individual’s identity in terms of group behaviour.
The concept of identity fusion28 has been developed, under which conditions are such that individual identity is
lost and substituted for group identity. This is a contributory factor in understanding how individuals become
compliant with extreme behaviours that are a function of the group29 and represent “unconditional commitment
and intractability”.30 Collectively these contributions represent influential aspects of the literature, describing
ways in which individuals and groups could interact. The challenge comes in engaging these theoretical concepts
in a computational form.
3. EMPLOYING COMPUTATION
There are diverse approaches to modelling group behaviour in a computational form. Different approaches
represent a continuum between modelling the interactions of individual actors independent of groups, as opposed
to recognising a group as an entity in its own right with characteristics capable of influence or action on others.31
There are numerous approaches, at a high level, that seek to make deductions based on structure and interaction
rather than explicit psychological theories. Examples include the biologically inspired “Blau space”,32 which
functions based on homophily, - that is those with similar socio-demographic characteristics are more likely to be
associated by involvement in similar groups. Blau spaces project this information and find equilibrium between
potentially competing groups, using a system of differential equations to derive a competition matrix between
finite resources (individual participation). Explicitly modelling systems dynamics is also possible. This uses non-
linear relationships between the forces influencing group behaviour,33 employing “stocks and flows” which are the
abstract representations of virtual (or physical) commodities and their local connection and influence. Hybrid
approaches to modelling have also emerged,34,35 which combine multiple layers of cognitive modelling with a
wide range of variables. However, to make progress on modelling while taking into account explicit psychological
theory, it is reasonable to focus on representing individuals within the model. Agent-based modelling is a
particularly useful vehicle to achieve this, and defines the scope of our interest in this paper.
3.1 Understanding in-group and out-group effects: a framework
In light of considerable previous work, we argue that a key point of reference for understanding inter-group
behaviour concerns in-group and out-group effects, and therefore focussing attention on this is important. Conflict
is frequently group-based and understanding how social and psychological dynamics support positive in-group
behaviour and negative out-group behaviour is highly valuable. Bias and inter-group conflict remain a “problem
of the century”,36 and frame many of society’s divisions.
In-group assortment is well-seen in human behaviour, being easily triggered by attraction on the basis of
some degree of similarity. Lab-based experiments have shown that this can occur based on trivial or arbitrary
displays of similarity.6,22,24,37 This has contributed to a misperception that positive discrimination to the in-
group and negative discrimination to the out-group are inevitable.23 Consequently understanding the separate
roles of in-group and out-group discrimination is socially important, in particular understanding how it becomes
manifested through social mechanisms. Psychological theory can be embedded in different aspects of agent-
based computational simulation,38 and is well-suited to exploring in-group and out-group effects. We focus on
evolutionary modelling, where natural selection, after periods of interaction, is repeatedly applied. Psychological
and social considerations can be embedded in such models and their effects observed.39 In particular we highlight
four key considerations where theory can be embedded to further understand group dynamics.
• Scope of interactions. This issue relates to how individuals are assumed to mix and interact. This
can be affected by a-priori levels of discrimination, either positive towards the in-group, negative towards
towards the out-group. Equally observation of the evolution of these factors may be the purpose. Modelling
decisions can be informed by potential scenarios and there are a range of examples in the literature. For
example, a-priori structure from placing agents on a regular lattice has been previously adopted,26 using
the lattice to control the possible interactions with only adjacent agents. Rewiring of this lattice has also
been considered,40 allowing the co-evolution of interactions alongside other agent-based behaviour. Other
approaches have involved sampling agents on a probabilistic basis from sets (i.e., groups), and allowing
agents to freely change sets.25 Segregation of the population into islands is also possible.41
• Form of interactions. Interactions need to be characterised in terms of actions and responses. Social
and psychological theories can be embedded at this point, ranging from assumptions about mimicry, social
learning42 or attraction through homophily.25 Game theory is often (but not always) used in this context,
being a mechanism through which individuals are faced with a social dilemma. Decision-making in this
context occurs as a consequence of a social dilemma - where agents are faced with an interaction through
which cooperation may occur.43 Wide-ranging social, psychological and economic factors can have influ-
ence. For example, these may involve the social norms of a group,44 strategies being inherited from others
in the population, such as through cultural means,42 as a consequence of identity,28 or reinforcement of
decisions from multiple sources. Social Impact Theory, proposed by Latane´45 is one example of how an
individual may be influenced by multiple factors, as explored in contexts such as opinion formation, beliefs
and culture.46,47
• Basis for discrimination. Within modelling, agents need to be able to identify48 with others, individually
or collectively, to determine the extent that they are in-group or out-group. The agent’s disposition towards
discrimination represents their attitude, framing an individuals world view. Humans are well-known to act
on the basis of social comparison49,50 and this has been found to be important for cooperation scenarios
based on donation.51 Various approaches to assessing similarity have been proposed. For example, may
agents carry a number of discrete traits may compare themselves for similarity, with actions proportional to
the extent of commonality.42 More generally, a range of tag-based models26,52–58 are known, that are used
to spontaneously enable cooperation based on propagation of behavioural strategies. Social norms of the
group may also be influential over group members’ discriminatory behaviour,59 and the role of social norms
in cooperation is significant44 in potentially supporting punishment.60 Discrimination can also take the
form of reputation distortion, preferential selection for interaction, or particular actions, such as out-group
hostility concurrently with in-group favoritism.3,4, 61–63
• Consequences of interaction. As the result of behaviour, individuals and groups are affected. This can
be modelled in wide-ranging social or economic terms. Exit from a group, either as a consequence of the
group (e.g., ostracism64) or by the individual walking away65 is an important consideration. Humans are
well-disposed to detecting potential ostracism in a group setting.66 Additionally representation of activity
in economic terms, through the potential costs and benefits of interaction are commonplace, particularly
in game theoretic models that are cooperation based.43 Reputation systems67,68 are also a further way in
which individual behaviours can be assessed, used as a measure of social standing.69 These may operate
in conjunction with social norms, that are the basis for judgements. Different groups may have different
perspectives, as represented by social norms or group identity, leading to different forms of social penalty
or reward. This may also take the form of punishment.60
3.2 Visualisation and interpretation
Finally we remark on the importance of visualisation and interpretation of generative models. Simulations
involving large numbers of agents may result in complex feedback to the user which can be challenging to represent
and assess.70 This is also true with regard to real-world data sets,71 and understanding the relationships between
visually represented actions and system parameters (e.g., real time social network metrics) in human terms is
a step which is critical in aiding consistent ‘tellability’ and interpretation. Users with different perceptions and
experiences may well be susceptible to different types of bias in making judgements on observed changes to a
scenario. If it becomes possible to make this connection between the metrics characterising a system and the
visual behaviour of that system then prospects to enhance human-machine intelligence will be furthered.
3.3 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented insights into how social and psychological theory can be embedded into evo-
lutionary agent-based simulations. There are a range of relevant social and psychological theories that can be
incorporated into models. We focus on the importance of in-group and out-group behaviour, and highlight de-
grees of freedom concerning the incorporation of theory into the model. These choices relate to the scope and
form of interactions between agents, the basis for discrimination and the possible consequences of interaction on
the individual or group. We also remark on the importance of making further developments with visualisation
and interpretation of models of this nature.
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